Abstract-In this paper, we address the popular content distribution (PCD) problem in a highway scenario, in which popular files are distributed to a group of on-board units (OBUs) driving through a single roadside unit (RSU). Due to the high speeds, the OBUs may not finish downloading a large file within the limited time for vehicle-to-roadside (V2R) communication and a peer-topeer (P2P) network consisting of OBUs out of the RSU coverage can be constructed for completing the file delivery process. However, due to fast and unpredictable topological changes of the vehicular ad hoc network (VANET), the static methods in traditional P2P networks can be inefficient. We model this problem as a coalition formation game with transferable utilities, and propose a coalition formation algorithm that converges into a Nash-stable partition adapting to environmental changes. Based on this algorithm, we further propose a distributed scheme for the overall PCD problem. Simulation results show that our scheme presents a considerable performance improvement relative to the non-cooperative case using the carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA).
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have been envisioned to provide increased convenience and efficiency to drivers, with numerous applications ranging from safety, transportation efficiency to information and entertainment [1] , [2] . One particular type of service, popular content distribution (PCD) has attracted lots of attentions recently, where multimedia contents are distributed from the roadside units (RSUs) to the on-board units (OBUs) driving through an area of interest (AoI) [3] , [4] . Unlike downloading services on the Internet [5] or their direct extensions in the VANETs where various vehicles are interested in different files from the Internet server [6] , the users in PCD are interested in a single large file when driving through an AoI with high speeds. Thus, the OBUs may fail to download the entire file within the limited vehicle-toroadside (V2R) time. Therefore, peer-to-peer (p2p) schemes are necessary for completing the file dissemination process. Unlike the P2P networks on the Internet, the wireless links in VANETs are very unreliable and the network topology is always changing, due to the high mobility and changing environment of OBUs. Some work introduces game theory in vehicular access to coordinate vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications [7] . Some work adopt network coding (NC) for content downloading in VANETs [3] for the efficiency in transmissions and simplicity in scheduling.
In this paper, we propose a distributed approach based on coalition formation games to address the data dissemination problem. Coalition formation games, in which the players cooperate with each other by forming coalitions to improve their individual profits, have recently been used in many scenarios, e.g., for the RSUs cooperation in [8] and relay cooperation in [9] . In our scenario, we formulate the PCD problem as a coalition formation game, and propose a coalition formation algorithm that converges into a Nash-stable partition adapting to environmental changes. Simulation results show that our scheme presents a considerable performance improvement relative to the non-cooperative case using the carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide the system model. In Section III, we formulate the problem as a coalition formation game. In Section IV, the coalition formation algorithm and the entire paradigm for the PCD problem are introduced. In Section V, simulation results are presented. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL Consider a network where N OBUs, denoted by Ω = {1, 2, . . . , N}, are passing through a RSU, as shown in Fig. 1 . A popular file with M equal segments, denoted by Γ = {γ 1 , γ 2 , . . . , γ M }, needs to be transmitted to all OBUs. This process has two periods: the V2R period and the V2V period. In the V2R period, the RSU periodically broadcasts the segments and all vehicles within distance D/2 receive the data. In the V2V period when all OBUs have passed the RSU, the OBUs exchange segments to complete the entire file. We assume the segments are randomly distributed among the OBUs with probability p s at the beginning. The mobility model is summarized as follows:
1) The N OBUs are randomly placed on both lanes within length L at the beginning of the simulation. 2) The initial speed of OBU i ∈ Ω, denoted by v i (0), is randomly given between v min and v max .
3) The speed of OBU i ∈ Ω satisfies:
where p is the probability of acceleration or deceleration. 4) For any OBU i ∈ Ω with OBU j 1 ahead in the same lane and OBU j 2 ahead in the other lane, OBU i switches to the other lane if For the V2V channel, we assume the link exists only between vehicles with a line of sight (LOS), or "neighbors" [10] . For the existing links, we only consider the pathloss without small-scale fading. Thus, the V2V rate is given by
where d i,j is the distance between OBU i and OBU j, n is the pathloss exponent, η represents signal-to-noise rate (SNR) at transmitters, and W is the bandwidth. We assume no data is achieved, if the transmitter broadcasts at a higher rate than c i,j , or the receiver receives from more than one transmitters. III. COALITION FORMATION GAME In the proposed PCD problem, we suppose the RSU has the motivation to encourage the OBUs to disseminate the popular file. Driven by the potential payments, the OBUs may cooperate with or compete against each other. We will analyze this problem with a coalition formation game model, in which OBUs form coalitions to compete against each other.
A. Utility Function
We consider the average delay τ a = τ t /N with τ t where τ t represents the total delay experienced by all OBUs. For any given content distribution scheme, τ t is given by the area between the cumulative demand curve and cumulative service curve [11] . We assume all arrivals of demand occur instantaneously at the beginning of the V2V period and stay unchanged ever since. Thus, the average delay τ a is given by
where NM is the constant demand, P (t) = i∈Ω |Γ i | is the number of total possessed segments, and τ m is the maximal delay when P (τ m ) = NM and the process completes.
We define a standard scheme T where
For any given scheme X, it enjoys a reduction in total delay if its service rate x = dP X (t)/dt > 1, as shown by the area between the cumulative service curve of scheme X and the cumulative service curve of scheme T in Fig. 2 . This area can be divided into τ X m pieces with each, e.g., the shaded area, representing the contribution from a slot. Thus, the reduction in average delay is given by We assume the RSU profit R X is proportional to the reduction in average delay compared with scheme T . Thus,
Δτ a (t) with α > 0 as the pricing factor, which can be divided into exact τ X m pieces with each αN Δτ a (t) representing the contribution in slot t. The broadcasting OBUs in slot t, the set of which is given by S ⊆ Ω, should be paid the corresponding profit. Thus, the utility function of S ⊆ Ω is given by
It can be proved that U (S) ≥ 0 is an increasing concave function with independent variable 1 ≤ x < NM − P X (t). In (5), the exact expression of x is still missing. We propose a greedy algorithm for choosing the specific segment broadcasted by each OBU in S, where OBU i ∈ S broadcasts γ k ∈ Γ i only if γ k is the "most wanted" segment among OBU i's "alive neighbors". The "alive neighbors" are OBU i's neighbors that can successfully receive data from OBU i, the set of which is given by
and the "most wanted" segment is the one with the most potential users which is given by
where Ω * i (γ l ) is the set of alive neighbors lacks γ l given by
Thus, by using the greedy algorithm, x is given by
B. Coalitional Game Definition 1: A coalitional game with transferable utility is defined by a pair (Ω, V ), where Ω is the set of players and V is a function over the real line such that for every coalition S ⊆ Ω, V (S) is a real number describing the amount of value that coalition S receives, which can be distributed in any arbitrary manner among the members of S.
As we see, for calculating U (S), certain information needs to be exchanged among the OBUs. This cost is given by the following function with β as the pricing factor.
Thus, given the payment formulated in (5) and the cost in (10), the value function of any coalition S ⊆ Ω is given by
This value V (S) representing the transferable profit of coalition S that can be arbitrarily apportioned among the members of S and we immediately have the following property:
The proposed problem is modeled as a coalitional game with transferable utility (Ω, V ), where Ω is the set of all OBUs and V is the value function in (11).
We denote by φ i (S) as the payoff received by any OBU i ∈ S, and φ(
as the payoff vector of coalition S. We suppose the individual value of OBU i ∈ S is proportional to the number of segments OBU i successfully delivers, which is given by:
Definition 2: Given the grand coalition Ω consisting of all OBUs, any payoff vector φ(Ω) for dividing the coalition value V (Ω), is said to be group rational if i∈Ω φ i (Ω) = V (Ω), and to be individually rational if each player can obtain a benefit no less than acting alone, i.e., φ i (Ω) > V ({i}), ∀i ∈ Ω. An imputation is a payoff vector satisfying both the conditions. Definition 3: The core of the grand coalition is defined as
In other words, the core of the grand coalition is the set of imputations where the OBUs have no incentive to reject the proposed payoff allocation, deviate from the grand coalition Ω, and form a coalition S instead.
In our problem, the grand coalition Ω has no service rate due to the severe interference. By substituting x = 0 to the corresponding functions, we have V (Ω) = −[NM − P (t)] − βN , which is a negative value. For any OBU i ∈ Ω, the service rate when OBU i acting alone is given by x = Ω * i (γ 
, and this payoff vector φ(Ω) can not be group rational. Consequently, there is no imputation for the grand coalition Ω and κ(Ω) = ∅, which implies that the grand coalition will seldom form. Actually, the OBUs will deviate from the grand coalition and form independent disjoint coalitions. Hence, the proposed coalitional game is a (Ω, V ) coalition formation game [12] .
IV. COALITION FORMATION ALGORITHM
In this section, we devise a distributed coalition formation algorithm for OBUs to form competitive coalitions.
A. Distributed Coalition Formation Algorithm
Definition 4: A coalition partition is defined as the set Π = {S 1 , . . . , S l }, which partitions the players set Ω, i.e., ∀k, S k ⊆ Ω are disjoint coalitions such that l k=1 {S k } = Ω. Further, we denote by S Π (i), the coalition S k ∈ Π, such that i ∈ S k .
Definition 5: For any player i ∈ Ω, a preference relation or order i is defined as a complete, reflexive, and transitive binary relation over the set of all coalitions that player i can possibly form, i.e., the set {S k ⊆ Ω : i ∈ S k }.
For any given player i ∈ Ω, S 1 i S 2 implies that player i prefers being a member of coalition S 1 with i ∈ S 1 over being a member of coalition S 2 with i ∈ S 2 , or at least, OBU i prefers both coalitions equally. In this paper, the preferences of any OBU i ∈ Ω with i ∈ S 1 , S 2 is quantified as follows:
where A(i) is the set of i's "friendly" coalitions defined by
This definition implies that OBU i prefers being a member of S 1 over S 2 only when OBU i gains an increase in individual profit and meanwhile no other OBUs in S 1 suffers a decrease because of OBU i's joining.
Definition 7: Given any OBU i ∈ Ω, the history H(i) is defined as the set of coalitions that OBU i visited and left.
Basic Rule: Given a partition Π = {S 1 , . . . , S l } of the OBUs set Ω, a switch operation from S Π (i) to S k ∈ Π ∪ {∅}, S k = S Π (i) is allowed for any OBU i ∈ Ω, if and only if S k ∪ {i} i S Π (i) and S k ∪ {i} / ∈ H(i). Any OBU i ∈ Ω can leave its current coalition S Π (i), and join another coalition S k ∈ Π, given that the new coalition S k ∪{i} is strictly preferred over S Π (i) through the preference relation defined in (14). We suppose the order in which the OBUs make their switch operations is random.
Proposition 1: Starting from any initial coalitional partition Π initial , the proposed algorithm maps to a sequence of switch operations, which always converges to a final partition Π f inal composed of a number of disjoint coalitions.
Proof: By carefully inspecting the preference defined in (14), we find that a single switch operation will either yields an unvisited partition, or a visited partition where one coalition degenerates to a singleton (the set with a single element). When it comes to the partition Π where OBU i forms a singleton, this non-cooperative OBU i must either join a new coalition or decide to remain non-cooperative. If OBU i decides to remain non-cooperative, then the current partition Π can not be changed to any visited partitions in the next round.
TABLE I THE SCHEME FOR THE POPULAR CONTENT DISTRIBUTION PROBLEM

Stage I: Network Discovery
Each OBU performs a neighbor discovery algorithm to obtain necessary information, and sets the initial partition Π initial = Π final , where Π final is the final partition in the last slot (in the first slot Π initial = Ω). Stage II: Coalition Formation * repeat 1) OBU i searches for a possible switch operation according to the basic rule in Section IV. 2) If such switch operation exists, OBU i performs the follows steps: a) Updates the history collection H(i) by adding coalition S Πcurrent (i), before leaving it. b) Leaves the current coalition S Πcurrent (i). c) Joins the new coalition S Πnext (i) that improves its payoff. * until the partition converges to a final Nash-stable partition Π final .
Stage III: Data Broadcasting
The OBUs of coalition S broadcast the segments achieved by the greedy algorithm in Section III, where S ∈ Π final is the coalition with the highest service rate in (9) .
If OBU i decides to join a new coalition, then the switch operation made by OBU i will form an unvisited partition without non-cooperative OBUs. In either case, an unvisited partition will form. As the number of partitions for a given set is finite, the sequence of switch operations will always terminate and converge to a final partition Π f inal after finite turns. Thus, we complete the proof.
Definition 7:
Proposition 2: Any partition Π f inal resulting from the proposed algorithm is Nash-stable.
Proof: Suppose the final partition Π f inal is not Nash-stable. Consequently, there exists an OBU i ∈ Ω, and a coalition S k ∈ Π f inal such that S k ∪ {i} i S Π final (i). Based on our algorithm, OBU i can perform a switch operation from S Π final (i) to S k , which contradicts the fact that Π f inal is the final partition. Thus, we complete the prove.
B. Popular Content Distribution Paradigm
Combining the coalition formation algorithm for the OBUs cooperation and the greedy algorithm for segments choosing. A summary of the entire scheme for the proposed PCD problem is given by Table I. In the first stage, an efficient neighbor discovery method is used to capture any changes in the network structure and record them as the local information of each OBU [13] . In the second stage, we use a coalition formation algorithm to divide the OBUs, which converges to a Nash-stable partition. In the third stage, the coalition in the final partition with the highest value broadcasts the corresponding segments. To adapt to the changing network topology, the three stages are repeated periodically.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, the performance of the proposed scheme in Table I is simulated in various environmental conditions and compared with CSMA/CA in many aspects, in which any OBU will randomly broadcast one of its possessed segments as long as no signal can be detected in the V2V channel. The parameters are shown in Table II.   TABLE II  PARAMETERS In Fig. 3 , we show the cumulative service curves for both the proposed scheme and CSMA/CA with N = 5, M = 5, p s = 0.6, where the vertical coordinate has been normalized by NM. As we can see, the total possessed segments increase with time by both methods, but our proposed scheme achieves a better performance. In CSMA/CA, the OBUs only check the channel condition to avoid potential collisions (though still with hidden terminal problem). However, in our paradigm, the channel condition together with the individual requests are considered. Thus, our proposed scheme, aiming at improving the total profit, or equally, reducing the average delay, performs better than CSMA/CA which just avoids collisions.
In Fig. 4 , we show the number of transmitters in the network as a function of time by both the proposed paradigm and CSMA/CA with N = 7, M = 5, p s = 0.6. As we can see, the number of transmitters by the proposed scheme declines to a low level compared with CSMA/CA. With more segments exchanged by nearby OBUs, the potential users decrease for each segment, which highly lowers the profit for broadcasting and consequently leads to the descending transmitters, or equivalently, the lower power consumption.
In Fig. 5 , we show the average delay as a function of N by both the proposed scheme and CSMA/CA with M = 3, p s = 0.6. We can see the average delay decreases with increasing OBUs by both methods. This decrease in average delay is due to the improvement of connectivity among the OBUs, which highly enhances the service rate in (9) by increasing "alive neighbors". However, if there are too many OBUs in the network and the traffic density, defined by N/L, becomes heavy, the advantage of increasing connectivity will be offset by the increasing collisions. As shown in Fig. 5 , the average delay curve becomes flat as the number of OBUs increases.
In Fig. 6 , we show the average delay as a function of p s by both the proposed paradigm and CSMA/CA with N = 5, M = 5. As we can see from Fig. 6 , the average delay decreases rapidly with increasing p s . This decrease in average delay is due to the increase in the amount of segments that have been directly delivered by the RSU P (0). By inspecting the expression of the average delay in (3), we can see P (t) plays an significant role in calculating the average delay. Consequently, we can expect a rapid decrease in τ a with increasing initial segments, as shown in Fig. 6 .
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a distributed algorithm based on coalition formation games to address the PCD problem in VANETs. In the proposed game model, the RSU pays the OBUs for broadcasting certain segments and the OBUs cooperate to form coalitions for improving their payoff. The coalition formation algorithm converges to a final Nashstable partition. Simulation results show that our scheme has a better performance with various conditions in both average delay and power consumption, compared with CSMA/CA.
